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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Civil No, 88-0251 
Priority 14a 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Pursuant to permission granted by order of this Court 
on July 5, 1989, the Utah Mining Association ("Association") sub-
mits this brief as Amicus Curiae in support of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision that Amax Magnesium Corporation 
("Amax") should be assessed as a mine, but in support of Amax's 
position that it is nonetheless entitled to the same 20% reduc-
tion in the valuation of its state-assessed property that is 
extended to county-assessed property. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s a c t i o n pursuant t o 
Utah Code Ann. S 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( e ) ( i i ) (1988) , Utah Code Ann. 
S 5 9 - 1 - 6 0 2 ( 3 ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( a now r e p e a l e d part of the Tax Court A c t 1 ) , 
and Rule 14 of the r u l e s of the Utah Supreme Court . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does the Utah S t a t e Tax Commission's a s s e s s m e n t of 
Amax's t a x a b l e mining proper ty at a r a t e 20% h i g h e r than o t h e r 
s t a t e - a s s e s s e d r a i l r o a d p r o p e r t y , or o t h e r c o u n t y - a s s e s s e d com-
m e r c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l r e a l proper ty v i o l a t e the equal p r o t e c t i o n 
and due p r o c e s s components of A r t i c l e X I I I , s e c t i o n 3 and A r t i c l e 
I , s e c t i o n 24 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n and the due p r o c e s s and 
2 
equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of the Uni ted S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ? 
1
 Section 59-1-602(3) (1987) of the Tax Court Act gave the taxpayer the 
option of appealing the Tax Commission's Final Decision to the d i s t r i c t court 
for an "original, independent and de novo" tr ia l under section 59-1-603(1) or 
to this Court under section 59-1-602(3) for appellate review upon writ of cer-
t iorari • Amax exercised the latter option* Docketing Statement at Appendix 
3. 
2
 This brief summarizes and comments upon arguments the parties have already 
made with respect to other issues, most notably the definition of "appurte-
nant
 f" in order to reach the constitutional issues the parties did not 
discuss. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article XIIIf section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according to 
its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law such 
provisions as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of hisf her or its 
tangible property. . . . 
Article I, section 24 provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
The "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provide in 
pertinent part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3 (1986) provides in pertinent part: 
[A]ll . . . mines and mining claims and 
other valuable deposits, including 
nonmetalliferous minerals underlying land the 
surface of which is owned by a person other 
than the owner of such minerals, all machin-
ery used in mining and all property or 
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surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims . . . must be assessed 
by the state tax commission . . . . All 
taxable property not required by the Consti-
tution or by the law to be assessed by the 
state tax commission must be assessed by the 
county assessor of the several counties in 
which the same is situated. For the purposes 
of taxation, all mills, reduction works, and 
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of 
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or 
mining claim by the owner thereof shall be 
deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or 
mining claim though the same is not upon such 
mine or mining claim. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986) provides in pertinent 
part: 
When the county asses[s]or uses the compara-
ble sales or cost appraisal method in valuing 
taxable property for assessment purposes, the 
assessor is required to recognize that 
various fees, services, closing costs, and 
other expenses related to the transaction 
lessen the actual amount that may be received 
in the transaction. The county assessor 
shall, therefore, take 80% of the value based 
on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the 
property as its reasonable fair cash value 
for purposes of assessment.3 
49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(1) provides: 
(b) the following acts unreasonably 
burden and discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and a state, subdivision of a 
state, or authority acting for a state or 
subdivision of a state may not do any of 
them: 
3
 A revised version of section 59-5-4.5 was enacted in 1987 and is codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304 (Supp. 1989). 
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(1) a s s e s s r a i l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n 
p r o p e r t y at a v a l u e tha t has a h igher r a t i o 
t o the t rue market v a l u e of the r e a l t r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n property than the r a t i o t h a t the 
a s s e s s e d v a l u e of o ther commercial and 
i n d u s t r i a l property in the same as ses sment 
j u r i s d i c t i o n has t o the t rue market v a l u e of 
the o ther commercial and i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o p e r t y . 4 
The e n t i r e t e x t s of the p r o v i s i o n s p a r t i a l l y quoted 
above are reproduced in Appendix A to t h i s b r i e f . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 . Nature of Proceedings 
The Mining A s s o c i a t i o n agrees wi th Amax's Statement of 
t h e Case , but reproduces here an a b b r e v i a t e d v e r s i o n for the 
C o u r t ' s c o n v e n i e n c e . 
By t h i s a p p e a l , Amax s e e k s review of the Utah S t a t e Tax 
Commiss ion's ("Tax Commission") F i n a l D e c i s i o n de te r m in in g the 
1986 a s s e s s e d v a l u e of Amax's r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d 
in Tooe l e County, Utah. The Tax Commission o r i g i n a l l y a s s e s s e d 
4
 The wording and structure of section 306 of the Railroad Revitalization 
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the "4R Act"), Pub.L. No. 94-210, S 306, 90 
Stat. 31, 33 (1976) were changed when the section was recodified as part of 
the revised Interstate Commerce Act. See Act of October 17, 1978, Pub.L No. 
95-473, S 11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445-46. The language quoted above i s as i t 
appears in the current law, 49 U.S.C. S 11503. The United States Distr ict 
Court in Union Pacific Railroad Company, et a l . v. State Tax Conmission of 
Utah, et a l . No. C-82-0998J, s l ip op. (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) at 3, quoted a 
s l ight ly different version in effect before 1978. The 1978 recodification 
"was not meant to change the substantive law." Id. 
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the value of Amax's property as of January 1, 1986 at 
$84,332,150. After an informal hearing held on August 25, 1986, 
the Tax Commission reduced the assessed value of Amax's property 
to $78,312,895. The Tax Commission thereafter held a plenary 
formal hearing to determine the fair market value of Amax's 
property. On December 21, 1987, the Tax Commission issued a 
Final Decision further reducing the assessed value of Amax's 
property by approximately $6,000,000, based upon the Commission's 
finding that dike maintenance should have been expensed rather 
than included as a capital investment. See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Docketing Statement at 
Appendix 2. The Tax Commission confirmed all other aspects of 
the Property Tax Division's assessment. Jjd. Amax thereafter 
filed a Petition for Reconsideration, which the Tax Commission 
denied by order dated May 31, 1988. See Docketing Statement at 
Appendix 1. Amax then filed a Petition for Review with this 
Court on June 29, 1988. Id. at Appendix 3. 
2. Statement of Facts 
The Tax Commission, after using comparable sales and 
cost approaches to assessing taxable value (Tr. 151-152, 155-156) 
and making the adjustments summarized above, set the "reasonable 
fair cash value" of Amax's property as of January 1, 1986 .at 
$78,312,895. In setting this "reasonable fair cash value," the 
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Tax Commission declined to value Amax's property pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5 (1986), which requires county assessors to 
"take 80% of the value [of county-assessed property] based on 
comparable sales of cost or cost appraisal of the property as its 
reasonable fair cash value for assessment." The Tax Commission 
concluded that section 59-5-4.5 "does not apply to property which 
is centrally assessed such as the subject property." Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision at paragraph 1. 
Likewise, the Tax Commission concluded that its failure to extend 
the 20% reduction to state-assessed property was not unconstitu-
tional because this Court upheld section 59-5-4.5 against a 
facial constitutional challenge in Rio Alqom v. San Juan County, 
681 P-2d 184 (Utah 1984). Ld. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Mining Association recognizes this Court will 
ordinarily not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if 
5 
the issues can be resolved by statutory interpretation. Yet in 
this case, this Court must decide the constitutional issues Amax 
raises because the Tax Commission was correct in concluding, as a 
* See, e.g., Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197f 201 (Utah 1981) in which this 
Court declined to pass upon a constitutional question (statutory preference 
for maternal custody) when the case could be decided upon another basis (best 
interest of the child). 
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matter of statutory interpretation, that Amaxfs plant is "appur-
tenant" to a mine and, thus, subject to state-assessment, 
Amax argues it should receive a 20% reduction in the 
assessed value of its taxable property for two reasons: first, 
that Amax's plant and ponds are not "appurtenant" to a mine 
within the meaning of section 59-5-3 and, that, therefore, its 
property should be county-assessed rather that state-assessed; 
second, and in the alternative, if Amax's plant and ponds are 
"appurtenant" to the mine (i.e. the Great Salt Lake), the 20% 
reduction in section 59-5-4.5, by its terms limited to 
county-assessed property, is unconstitutional under Article XIII, 
section 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Tax Commission correctly concluded that "for 1986, 
[Amax's] subject property is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the 
Great Salt Lake ponds from which the minerals were extractedt,3" 
for four reasons. 
First, the usually accepted meaning of "appurtenant," 
which deems an appendage to be an "appurtenance" to the extent it 
passes with the property when title transfers, cannot apply to 
Amax's plant because the "mine," or the Great Salt Lake, is not 
subject to taxation as property. 
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Second, the cases Amax cites in support of its narrow 
definition of "appurtenant" involve facts significantly dissimi-
lar to those of this case. 
Third, a common sense application of the rules of 
statutory construction leads to the conclusion that Amax's plant 
should be "deemed" appurtenant to the mine. 
And fourth, the Amax plant is "appurtenant" to the 
mine, because it "belongs to" the mine in the sense that the 
lake, ponds and plant functioned as a complete unit. Hence, 
Amaxfs property was properly classified as state-assessed, rather 
than county-assessed, property. 
Nonetheless, the Tax Commission's failure to extend the 
same 20% discount available to county-assessed property under 
section 59-5-4.5 to Amax's property violates Amax's state and 
federal constitutional guarantees to due process and equal 
protection of the law. 
Amax demonstrates in its brief that the Tax 
Commission's assessment of its property violates Article XIII, 
section 3 of the Utah Constitution because (1) the evidence 
before the Tax Commission demonstrated that failure to extend the 
20% discount to Amax's property widened rather than narrowed the 
disparity between state-assessed and county-assessed property; 
and (2) as a result of the federal district court ruling in Union 
-9-
Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commission, railroads, which are 
state-assessed property like mines, have received the benefit of 
the 20% discount, although mines have not. 
In addition, the Tax Commission's refusal to apply the 
20% discount in calculating the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of 
Amax's property violates the due process and equal protection 
guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. 
From 1984 onward, the Tax Commission's overvaluation of 
mines, as compared to railroads, (resulting from Union Pacific) 
denies Amax and other mine owners the equal protection of the 
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. This conclusion is supported by the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
v. County Commissioner of Webster County, which held that "The 
relative undervaluation of comparable property . . . over 
time . . . denies . . . the equal protection of law." 
For similar reasons and using similar analyses, the Tax 
Commission's overvaluation of state-assessed mines as compared to 
state-assessed railroads violates the due process and equal 
protection components of Article 1, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY HELD THAT AMAX'S 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE STATE-ASSESSED, NOT 
COUNTY-ASSESSED, BECAUSE IT IS "APPURTENANT" 
TO A MINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 59-5-3 (1986), 
Section 59-5-3 provides, in pertinent part, that the 
Tax Commission shall assess all mines, mining claims, and all 
mining property. Section 59-5-3 continues to state that "For the 
purposes of taxation, all minerals, reduction works and smelters 
used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores 
from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof, shall be deemed 
to be appurtenant to the mine or such mining claim, though the 
same is not upon the mine or such mining claim." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Amax and the Tax Commission agree that neither the 
plant nor the pond is a "mine" or a "mining claim." The parties 
also agree to the obvious fact that the plant is not located 
"upon" the Great Salt Lake or on the ponds, and is instead built 
on a separate parcel of land which Amax owns in fee. Most 
critically, the parties agree that the plant, while neither a 
"mine" nor "mining claim," can be state-assessed if it is 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-3-1(8) (1986) defines a "mine" as "a natural deposit 
of . . . valuable mineral." "Mining claim" is not statutorily defined. 
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"appurtenant" to a mine. See Brief of Petitioner at 17, and 
Brief of Respondent at 7. 
The parties then devote the entire first section of 
their respective briefs to arguing the definition of "appurte-
nant." Amax claims that "appurtenant" must be interpreted and 
applied so as to mean "something that has been added or appended 
to a property and becomes an inherent part of the property; 
usually [passing] with the property when title is transferred." 
Brief of Petitioner at 18 and 19. The Tax Commission argues that 
"appurtenant" should be defined as "adjacent," "adjunct," or 
"within the same proximity." Brief of Respondent at 8. 
The Mining Association concludes the Tax Commission's 
interpretation of "appurtenant" as used in section 59-5-3 is 
correct for four reasons. 
First, the usually accepted meaning of "appurtenant," 
which deems an appendage to be an "appurtenance" to the extent it 
passes with the property when title it transferred, cannot apply 
to Amax's plant or ponds because the "mine," or the Great Salt 
Lake, is not subject to taxation as property. As this Court 
explained in Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company, 495 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1972): 
"Because it [the Great Salt Lake] is a 
navigable body of water, its bed belongs to 
the state subject to the control of Congress 
for navigation in commerce. . . . It is our 
opinion that the state as the owner of the 
-12-
beds of navigable bodies of water is entitled 
to all valuable minerals in or on them," -
such conclusion being affirmed and estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in the most 
recent decision of June 6, 1971.7 
The significance of Utah's ownership of all valuable 
minerals in or on the Great Salt Lake is that Amax has only "a 
non-exclusive right to extract and process" magnesium in the 
brine of the lake waters sold to it by the state on a royalty 
basis. See Utah Code Ann. S 65-1-15(3) (1986), now 65A-6-1 
(1988). If Amax's plant is not "appurtenant" to the mine, which 
by definition includes the Great Salt Lake as a "natural deposit 
of valuable mineral," Amax's property will not be state-assessed 
even though Amax appears to concede it engages in "mining," that 
is, "the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporation, 
or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine." Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-3-1(8) (1986).8 There is no evidence the legislature 
intended such an anomalous result. 
Second, the cases Amax cites in support of its narrow 
definition of "appurtenant" generally refer to appurtenances, 
7
 Quoting Deseret Livestock Company v. State, 171 P.2d 401 (Utah 1946), 
and making reference to Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971). 
8
 See Brief of Petitioner at 17 where Amax states "Although neither the 
plant nor the ponds are a mine or mining claim they can be centrally assessed 
if they are "appurtenant" to a mine." This concession presupposes that Amax 
is engaged in "mining/* 
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such as water r ights or easements, that n e c e s s a r i l y must be 
9 
conveyed for b e n e f i c i a l use of the lands. These cases are 
inappl icable because they decide whether incorporeal r igh t s pass 
as "appurtenances" to real property. The i ssue in t h i s appeal, 
however, i s whether taxable property, both real and personal (the 
Amax plant) i s an "appurtenance" to other tangible property (the 
Great Sa l t Lake or "mine") which cannot be conveyed. Almost a l l 
of the cases Amax's c i t e s def ine "appurtenance" on f a c t s s i g n i f i -
cant ly d i s s i m i l a r to those of t h i s case . 
Third, a common sense appl icat ion of the rules of 
s t a t u t o r y construct ion leads to the conclusion that Amaxfs plant 
should be "deemed" appurtenant to the mine. As the Tax 
Commission's br ief exp la ins , the term "appurtenant" can have 
mul t ip le meanings, including "adjunct," or "adjacent," which some 
of the a u t h o r i t i e s have accepted as synonymous with "appurte-
nant," depending upon the context in which "appurtenant" i s used. 
9
 The cases discussing whether incorporeal property can pass as an appur-
tenance, upon which Amax r e l i e s , are cited in Brief of Respondent at 11. 
*0 These rules, as set out in the Tax Commission's brief, are (1) the word 
of the statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole and not piecemeal; 
see Peay v, Board of Education of Provo City School Distr ict , 377 P.2d 490 
(Utah 1962); (2) the terms of the statute should be interpreted in accord with 
usually accepted meanings; Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985); 
and (3) each term of the statute was used advisedly and therefore should-be 
read l i t e r a l l y , unless a l i t e r a l meaning i s unreasonable, confusing or inoper-
able; see Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 1987). 
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See Brief of Respondent at 8. In this context "appurtenant" 
should mean "adjunct" because "appurtenant" cannot mean "conveyed 
for beneficial use of the lands." 
Fourth, Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W. 
1094 (Tex. Cir. App. 1917), upon which Amax places primary 
reliance in arguing its definition of "appurtenant," is inappli-
cable to the extent it defines "appurtenance" as that "• . . 
which passes as an incident to the principal thing." Id. at 
1095. Instead, the case lends support to the Tax Commission to 
the extent it defines "appurtenance" as "[a] thing belonging to 
another thing as principal . . . ," or "[a] thing used with, and 
related to, or dependent upon another thing more worthy . . . ." 
Id. at 1095. As noted, the Amax plant cannot pass as an 
"appurtenance" to the "principal thing," the mine, or Great Salt 
Lake, because the brine cannot be conveyed, yet the plant 
"belongs to" the lake in the sense that the Amax operation -
lake, ponds and plant - function as a unit. Amax stresses that 
the plant could have been built at great distance from the lake, 
Brief of Petitioner at 20, Tr. 35-37, but, in fact, the plant was 
built next to the lake and in 1986 processed brine from the ponds 
formed from lake waters. Tr. 49, 137, 142. The theoretical 
possibility that the plant could have functioned independently 
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from the lake should not overshadow the reality that in 1986 it 
did not. 
In summary, the Amax plant in 1986 should be deemed 
"appurtenant" to the mine, and, accordingly, the plant should be 
state-assessed, rather than county-assessed, property. 
II. THE TAX COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO EXTEND THE 
20% DISCOUNT AVAILABLE TO COUNTY-ASSESSED 
PROPERTY, UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-5-4.5 
(Supp. 1986), TO AMAX'S REAL AND TANGIBLE 
PROPERTY VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION COMPONENTS OF ARTICLE XIII, 
SECTION 3(1) AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A. The Tax Commission's Refusal to Apply Section 
59-5-4.5 in Calculating the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of 
Amax's Property Violates Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Amax demonstrates in Point II B of its opening brief 
and Point II of its Reply Brief that "the Commission's refusal to 
apply [section 59-5-4.5] to Amax's personal and real property 
violates the express statutory language of section 59-5-4.5 as 
well as the constitutional mandate of 'a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment on all tangible property.1 Utah Const, art. XIII, 
§ 3(1)." Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14. The issue, as Amax 
frames it in section II of its brief, is whether a legislative 
classification that gives some, but not all, taxpayers an immedi-
ate 20% deduction meets the standards of equality and uniformity 
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mandated under Article XIIIf section 3(1) of the Utah Constitu-
tion. Even though this Court upheld section 59-5-4.5 in Rio 
Alqom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) against a 
challenge that the statute was "facially unconstitutional," 681 
P.2d at 187, Amax explains two reasons why Rio Alqom is not 
controlling. 
First, the Rio Alqom plaintiffs adduced no evidence of 
actual nonuniformity in tax assessments of state-assessed proper-
ties as compared with county-assessed properties. In fact, the 
Rio Alqom Court repeatedly stressed that "the factual premises 
that state valuation and county valuation were not uniform has 
not been attacked." Ld. at 193. Accordingly, it was in the 
legislative prerogative to remedy a conceded disparity by dis-
counting local assessments: 
[T]he Legislature may seek to enforce the 
uniformity requirements of [Article XIII] 
S 3(1) by attempting to equalize the tax 
burden by those taxpayers who pay a greater 
tax in proportion to the value of their 
property than others. In permitting transac-
tion costs to be deducted from appraisals 
based on comparable sales or cost appraisal 
method, the Legislature has neither departed 
from the "cash value" requirement of Article 
XIII, S 3, nor gone beyond its constitutional 
duty to "prescribe by law such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation." 
Id. at 193-94. Amax correctly points out, however, that unlike 
Rio Alqom, the Tax Commission's refusal to extend the 20% 
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discount to Amax's property does not equalize the disparity 
between state-assessed and county-assessed property, but instead 
worsens the disparity. The cost appraisal method the Tax Commis-
sion used in valuing Amax's property is the same method the 
county would have used had Amax's property been county-assessed. 
Tr. 152, 155-56, 202-203. In this case, the distinction between 
state-assessed and county-assessed property hinges upon a legal 
point — the definition of "appurtenant" — which has no rela-
tionship to the property's fair market value. Tr. 253. See 
Brief of Petitioner at 40 and 41. Thus, the result of refusing 
to extend the 20% discount in valuing Amax's property, if it is 
state-assessed, is to widen the disparity between county-assessed 
and state-assessed property for arbitrary reasons. 
Second, Amax demonstrates in its reply brief that the 
United States District Court's decision in Union Pacific Rail-
road, et al., v. Utah State Tax Commission, et al.. No. 
C-82-0998J, slip op. (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) ("Union Pacific") 
compounds the tax inequity, even assuming a valid distinction 
between state-assessed and county-assessed property, by creating 
a disparity between the railroads and the mining companies, both 
of which are state-assessed properties. 
In Union Pacific, the plaintiff railroads, Union 
Pacific, the Denver & Rio Grande Western and Southern Pacific 
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brought consolidated actions in federal court against the Tax 
Commission, challenging their ad valorem property tax assessments 
for 1984 and 1985. The railroads successfully argued that the 
assessments discriminated against them in violation of section 
306 of the 4R Act, which makes it unlawful to assess railroad 
transportation property at a higher ratio to its "true market 
value" than the assessment ratio of all other commercial and 
industrial property compared to its "true market value" in the 
same assessment jurisdiction. See 49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(1) quoted 
supra. In determining whether the Tax Commission's assessments 
of the railroads discriminated against them, the court considered 
the effect of section 59-5-4.5 on the assessments of 
county-assessed commercial and industrial property. It concluded 
that reducing county assessments by 20% under section 59-5-4.5 
does not arrive at "true market value" for county-assessed 
property. Union Pacific, slip op. at 57. 
Union Pacific was decided after the parties filed their 
principal briefs. However, Amax argued in its Reply Brief: 
The effect of the Union Pacific decision is 
that, as of January 1, 1986, the tax lien 
date for Amax's property in the present case, 
the 20% discount of S 59-5-4.5 extended not 
only to the class of locally assessed real 
property, but also to all real and personal 
property of railroads included within the 
class of centrally assessed taxpayers. Thus, 
irrespective of whether the Commission, or 
this Court, agrees with the Union Pacific 
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c o u r t ' s interpretat ion of the 4R Act, the 
e f f e c t of that dec i s ion in creat ing a new 
c l a s s of taxpayers within the c l a s s of 
c e n t r a l l y assessed taxpayers cannot be 
ignored. 
Reply Brief of P e t i t i o n e r at 21. 
The taxing d i spar i ty between c l a s s e s of s t a t e - a s s e s s e d 
property owners that "cannot be ignored" as a r e s u l t of Union 
P a c i f i c v i o l a t e s the "overarching purpose" of A r t i c l e XIII , 
s e c t i o n s 2 and 3, which the Rio Alqom Court declared was "to 
achieve uniformity in the ad valorem taxing scheme." I d . at 194. 
B. The Tax Commission's Refusal to Apply Sect ion 
59 -5 -4 .5 in Calculat ing the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of 
Amax's Property Vio la tes the Due Process and Equal Protec t ion 
Clauses of the Federal Const i tut ion and the Due Procesjs and Equal 
Protec t ion Components of Ar t i c l e 1, Sect ion 24 of the Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Amax's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the taxing d i s p a r i t y between 
s t a t e - a s s e s s e d mines and rai lroads e f f ec ted by Union P a c i f i c i s 
important because i t ra i s e s addit ional c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s not 
d i scussed in e i ther party ' s br ie f . Recent d e c i s i o n s i ssued by 
1 1
 On May 10, 1989, the parties in Union Pacific stipulated to a dismissal 
of cross appeals each had taken to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on 
May 11, 1989, the Tenth Circuit entered i t s order dismissing the appeals, a 
copy of which order was attached to the motion of the Mining Association to 
f i l e a brief as Amicus Curiae. As a result of the Tenth C i r c u i t s dismissal 
of appeals taken from the d is tr ic t court judgment, the Union Pacific decision 
i s f ina l . From 1985 onward, the railroads wi l l be entit led to a reduction in 
value not available to other state-assessed property owners. See Union 
Pacific, s l i p op. at 57 and 58. 
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t h i s Court and the United States Supreme Court subsequent to 
Union P a c i f i c and the f i l i n g of the par t i e s 1 b r i e f s make i t c l ear 
that the s e c t i o n 59-5-4 .5 i s unconst i tut ional not only under 
A r t i c l e XIII , s e c t i o n 3 of the Utah Const i tut ion , but a l s o under 
the due process and equal protect ion c lauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Const i tut ion and A r t i c l e I , 
12 
s e c t i o n 24 of the Utah Const i tut ion." 
This Court's most recent analys i s of an equal protec -
t ion chal lenge to a s t a t e taxation scheme i s Blue Cross and Blue 
Shie ld v. State of Utah, No. 19676, s l i p op. (July 19, 1989) . In 
Blue Cross, t h i s Court upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of taxing the 
premium income of nonprofit health serv ice corporat ions , l i k e 
Blue Cross and Blue Shie ld , while exempting premium income of 
mutual benef i t a s soc ia t ions (MBAs") in the face of Blue Cross1 
argument that "MBAs are in a l l s i g n i f i c a n t respects 
1 2
 Condemann v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rptr. 5 (1989) i s 
authority that this Court may review a party's constitutional claims under any 
applicable constitutional provision, even though the party may have limited 
i t s argument to only one of several possible constitutional i ssues . Justice 
Durham's lead opinion reviewed certain provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-1 to 38 (1986 and Supp. 1988) under an 
equal protection and due process analysis, even though the due process issue 
had not been raised. See Opinion of Justice Durham at Part II and Part III ; 
the Opinion of Justice Zimmerman concurring in Part II (the "due process 
alternative" section of Justice Durham's opinion) and the Opinion of Justice 
Stewart suggesting that there was no reason to rely on a due process analysis, 
since i t had not been raised, Id. a t 22* Although Justice Stewart does not 
rely on the due process analysis, he does not suggest that such a review i s 
inappropriate. 
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ind is t inguishable from other insurers and compete d i r e c t l y 
against them." L3. at 9. Recognizing that the l e g i s l a t i v e 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n exempts MBAs that are adjuncts to r e l i g i o u s , 
cooperative or benevolent organizat ions , as well as those " that 
are apparently indis t inguishable from those taxed," _id. at 15, 
t h i s Court nonetheless upheld the taxing scheme because "Blue 
Cross fa i led to show that i t or any other insurer incurred any 
burden." I d . at 16. Consequently, the "misc lass i f ica t ion of 
insurers resu l t ing from the [taxing] measure is not su f f i c i en t to 
warrant s t r i k i n g down the t ax . " Id. 
The Court further concluded that i t s analys is under 
Ar t i c l e I , sect ion 24 of the Utah Const i tut ion was d i spos i t i ve of 
the equal protect ion claim under the United Sta tes Const i tu t ion 
s ince the Utah Const i tut ion required j u s t i f i c a t i o n under a more 
13 r igorous , although s imi la r , standard. 
1 J
 Jus t ice Zimmerman, speaking for the Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 
s t a t ed : 
The pr incip les and concepts embodied in the fed-
era l equal protect ion clause and the s t a t e uniform 
operation of the laws provision are subs tan t ia l ly sim-
i l a r . Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988); Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661,669-70 (Utah 1984). However, our exami-
nation into the reasonableness of economic l eg i s l a t ion 
under a r t i c l e I , section 24 of the Utah Consti tut ion 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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From Blue Cross and Blue Shield, it follows that 
(1) taxing schemes that misclassify taxpayers and unfairly burden 
some taxpayers (unlike the premium tax at issue in Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield) may be unconstitutional; and (2) taxing schemes that 
fail equal protection analysis under the federal constitution 
will surely fail the more exacting standard under Article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
In this case, section 59-5-4.5 is unconstitutional 
under the federal and state constitutions because its misapplica-
tion unlawfully and adversely impacts state-assessed mining 
property, as explained in Part III A. A similar taxation dispar-
ity was unanimously held unconstitutional under the federal equal 
protection clause by the United States Supreme Court in Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commissioner of Webster County, 
U.S. , 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989). 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
is at least as vigorous as that required by the fed-
eral equal protection clause, and probably more so. 
Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 889, 890; see Recent 
Developments, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 143, 317. Therefore, 
if the statutes under attack can withstand scrutiny 
under article I, section 24, they will not be found to 
violate the federal equal protection clause. 
Id. at 3. 
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The facts of Allegheny are simple: West Virginia's 
Webster County Tax Assessor valued Allegheny's property from 1975 
to 1986 on the basis of a recent purchase price, while valuing 
other similarly situated properties on the basis of previous 
assessments. This resulted in gross disparities between valua-
tions of properties in the same class. In its analysis of 
Webster County's treatment of Allegheny Coal Company, the Court 
acknowledged: 
The use of a general adjustment as a transi-
tional substitute for an individual reap-
praisal violates no constitutional command. 
As long as general adjustments are accurate 
enough over a short period of time to equal-
ize the differences in proportion between the 
assessments of a class of property holders, 
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. 
Id. at 697. 
It also stated: 
In each case, the constitutional requirement 
is the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality and tax treatment of similarly 
situated property owners. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
And that: 
The States, of course, have broad latitude to 
impose and collect taxes. A State may divide 
different kinds of property into classes and 
assign to each class a different tax burden 
so long as those divisions and burdens are 
reasonable. 
Id. (emphases added). 
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However, the Court concluded: 
We have no doubt that petitioners have 
suffered from such "intentional systematic 
undervaluation by state officials" of compa-
rable property in Webster County. Viewed in 
isolation, the assessments for petitioners1 
property may fully comply with West Virginia 
law. But the fairness of one's allocable 
share of the total share of the property tax 
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by 
a comparison with the share of others simi-
larly situated relative to their property 
holdings. The relative undervaluation of 
comparable property in Webster County over 
time therefore denies petitioner the equal 
protection of the law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The holding in Allegheny should control the outcome of 
this appeal because the salient facts of the two cases are 
substantially similar. As in Allegheny, the disparity between 
similarly situated property owners in this case will be perpetu-
ated over time unless Amax's assessment overvaluation is declared 
unconstitutional. From 1984 onward, the railroads will be 
entitled to compare their assessment ratios with those of 
county-assessed commercial and industrial property before the 20% 
reduction is applied to that property. The Union Pacific court 
explained: 
Thus, if the court is to compare true market 
value to true market value, it should compare 
values before any adjustments for transaction 
costs or other so-called intangibles are 
made. 
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Id. at 56. 
By comparing the r a i l r o a d ' s t rue market value to 
county-assessed real property before the 20% discount under 
sec t ion 59-5-4.5 was applied, the court concluded the percentages 
by which the ra i l roads were overvalued ranged between 26% and 46% 
for 1984 and 1985. 1 4 
Since mines, as s ta te -assessed property, are in the 
same c lass of property as r a i l roads , the Tax Commission's 
overvaluat ion of the mines, as compared to r a i l roads and as a 
r e s u l t of the r a i l r o a d ' s enti t lement to the 20% reduction under 
1 4
 This point can be i l l u s t r a t e d by an equation• The remedy under the 4R 
Act i s : 
Assessed value of Assessed value of County-
state-assessed r a i l must assessed commercial and 
t ransporta t ion property = indus t r ia l property 
True market value of r a i l True Market Value of County 
t ranspor ta t ion property assessed commercial and 
indus t r ia l property 
If the equation i s calculated before section 59-5-4.5 i s applied the r e s u l t 
i s : 
1.00 = 1.00 
1.00 1.00 
There is no discrimination. But if the equation is calculated after section 
59-5-4.5 is applied the result is: 
1.00 t .80 
1.00 1.00 
The railroads, under the facts assumed above, would have been assessed 20% too 
high. 
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section 59-5-4.5, denies Amax and other mine owners equal protec-
tion of the law under the federal constitution. 
For similar reasons, the Tax Commission's overvaluation 
of Amax and other mine owners violates Article I, section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution. The test here, as explained by Justice 
Zimmerman in Blue Cross and Blue Shield is "whether the classifi-
cation is reasonable, whether the objectives are legitimate, and 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classifi-
cation and the legislative purposes." Ld. at 3. As already 
explained, the classification of state-assessed railroads with 
county-assessed property under section 59-5-4.5, on the one hand, 
and all other state-assessed properties, on the other, is unrea-
sonable, and frustrates the legislatures objective in passing 
section 59-5-4.5, which was to narrow the disparity between 
state-assessed and county-assessed property valuations. 
A similar analysis and identical conclusion follows 
15 
under state and federal due process guarantees. Justice 
Durham's lead opinion in Condemarin stated: 
Most recently, in Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
890 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted) we phrased 
the test as follows: 
15
 Justice Durham's lead opinion in Condemarin commented that "Historically, 
the overlap between equal protection and due process has been considerable." 
Condemarin at 11. Consequently, if a classification violates equal protec-
tion, it likely violates due process as well. 
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"[The] [due process] test to be applied under 
Article I, section 24 is whether the classi-
fication of those subject to the legislation 
is a reasonable one and bears a reasonable 
relationship to an achievement of the legiti-
mate legislative purpose," 
The similarity of that test to a 
means-end review under the doctrine of due 
process is striking: 
"If the laws passed are seen to have a 
reasonable relation to a proper legislative 
purpose, and are neither arbitrary or dis-
criminatory, the requirements of due process 
are satisfied . . . " 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502f 537 (1934); 
see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980). 
Condemarin at 11. 
Hence, the overvaluation of Amax and other 
state-assessed mines as compared to state-assessed railroads 
violates the equal protection and due process components of 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission's Final Decision should be affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. The Court should affirm that part 
of the Tax Commission's Final Decision which holds that Amax's 
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plant is "appurtenant" to the mine, and is, thus, state-assessed, 
not county-assessed, property. 
The Court should reverse that part of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision holding that Amax is not entitled to 
the 20% reduction set out in section 59-5-4.5 in calculating the 
"reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's taxable property. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
August 7, 1989 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Const, art. XIII, S 3(1). 
2. Utah Const, art. I, § 24. 
3. United States Const, amend. XIV. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986). 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986). 
6. 49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(l)(1982). 
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rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, 
and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, spe-
cial districts, and all other political subdivisions 
of the state, except that to the extent and in the 
manner provided by the Legislature the property 
of a county, city, town, special district or other 
political subdivision of the state located outside 
af its geographic boundaries as defined by law 
may be subject to the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which 
is used exclusively for religious, charitable or ed-
ucational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private 
er corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as 
defined by statute. This exemption shall be im-
plemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on 
January 1, m., which is held for sale or processing 
and which is shipped to final destination outside this 
state within twelve months may be deemed by law to 
have acquired no situs in Utah for purposes of ad 
valorem piuperty taxation and may be exempted by 
law from such taxation, whether manufactured, pro-
cessed or produced or otherwise originating within or 
without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on 
January 1, m., held for side in the ordinary course of 
hwinmiii and which constitutes the inventory of any 
retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or 
livestock raiser may be deemed for purposes of ad 
valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power 
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and 
flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations 
far irrigating land within the state owned by such 
individuals or corporations, or the individual mem-
bers thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the 
extent that they shall be owned and used for such 
purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and 
ether property used for generating and delivering 
oWUiiml power, a portion of which is used for fur-
nishing power for pumping water for irrigation pur-
poses on lands in the state of Utah, may be exempted 
from taxation to the extent that such property is used 
far such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to 
the benefit of the users of water so pumped under 
such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated 
at such times and in such manner as may be provided 
bylaw. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the ex-
emption from taxation: of not to exceed 45% of the 
fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and 
equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at 
his place of abode in maintaining a home for himself 
and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served 
in any war in the military service of the United 
States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons 
or of persons who while serving in the military ser-
vice of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may 
be exempted as the Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from 
taxation as property or it may be taxed as property in 
such manner and to such extent as the Legislature 
may provide, but if taxed as property the income 
therefrom shall not also be taxed. Provided that if 
intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of 
valuation. 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an 
annual tax sufficient, with other sources of revenue, 
to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state 
for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the 
state debt, if any there be, the Legislature shall pro-
vide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the 
annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, 
within twenty years from the final passage of the law 
creating the debt. iss7 
Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible 
property — Livestock — Land used for 
agricultural purposes,) 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property 
in the state, according to its value in money, except 
as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such prop-
erty, so that every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangi-
ble property, provided that the Legislature may de-
termine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the 
Legislature prescribes, be sssessfri according to its 
value for agricultural use without regard to the value 
it may have for other purposes. isss 
S e c 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Ba-
sis and multiple — What to be assessed 
aa tangible property.] 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed as the Leg-
islature shall provide; but the basis and multiple now 
used in determining the value of metalliferous mines 
for taxation purposes and the additional assessed 
value of 15.00 per acre thereof shall not be changed 
before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until other-
wise provided -by-tew. All -other-mines -or mining 
claims and other valuable mineral deposits, including 
lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all ma-
chinery used in mining and all property or surface 
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or min-
ing claims, and the value of any surface use made of 
mining claims, or mining property for other than 
mining purposes, shall be assessed as other tangible 
property. isss 
Sec. 5. (Local authorities to levy local taxes — 
Sharing tax and revenues by political 
subdivisions.) 
Hie Legislature shall not impose taxes for the pur-
pose of any county, city, town or other municipal cor-
poration, but may, by law, vest in the corporate au-
thorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess 
and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained 
in this Constitution, political subdivisions may share 
their tax and other revenues with other political sub-
divisions as provided by statute. isss 
Sec 6. (Annual statement to be published.] 
An accurate statement of the receipts and expendi-
tures of the public moneys, shall be published annu-
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Sec 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. ISM 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. ISM 
Sec 24. [Uniform operation of laws.) 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation isss 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people isss 
Sec 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibi-
tory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are de-
clared to be otherwise. isss 
S e c 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. isss 
ARTICLE H 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section 
1. [State boundaries.] 
Section 1. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as 
follows 
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of 
the thirty-second degree of longitude west from 
Washington, with the thirty-seventh degree of north 
latitude, thence due west along said thirty-seventh 
degree of north latitude to the intersection of the 
same with the thirty-seventh degree of longitude 
west from Washington, thence due north along said 
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the inter-
section of the same with the forty-second degree of 
north latitude, thence due east along said forty-sec-
ond degree of north latitude to the intersection of the 
same with the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west 
from Washington; thence due south along said thirty-
fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of 
the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude, 
thence due east along said forty-first degree of north 
latitude to the intersection of the same with the 
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washing-
ton; thence due south along said thirty-second degree 
of west longitude to the place of beginning. isss 
ARTICLE III 
ORDINANCE 
[Ordinance.] 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of 
lands — Exemption.] 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
[Free nonsectanan schools.] 
[Ordinance.] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable with-
out the consent of the United States and the people of 
this State: isss 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is 
guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be 
molested in person or property on account of his or 
her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plu-
ral marriages are forever prohibited. isss 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation 
of lands — Exemption.) 
Second — The people inhabiting this State do af-
firm and declare that they forever disclaim all right 
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying 
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or 
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the 
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of 
the United States, and said Indian landls shall remain 
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
Congress of the United States. The lands belonging to 
citizens of the United States, residing without this 
State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the 
lands belonging to residents of this State, but nothing 
in this ordinance shall preclude this state from tax-
ing, as other lands are taxed, any lands owned or held 
by any Indian who has severed his tribal relations, 
and has obtained from the United States or from any 
person, by patent or other grant, a title thereto, save 
and except such lands as have been or may be 
granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of 
Congress, containing a provision exempting the lands 
thus granted from taxation, which last mentioned 
lands shall be exempt from taxation so long, and to 
such extent, as is or may be provided in the act of 
Congress granting the same. i«7 
[Territorial debts assumed.] 
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of 
Utah, incurred by authority of the Legislative Assem-
bly thereof, are hereby assumed and shall be paid by 
this State isss 
[Free nonsectarian schools.] 
Fourth — The Legislature shall make laws for the 
establishment and maintenance of a system of public 
schools, which shall be open to all the children of the 
State and be free from sectarian control isss 
ARTICLE IV 
ELECTIONS AND 
RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 
Section 
1 [Equal political rights] 
2 [Qualifications to vote ] 
3 [Voters — Immunity from arrest ] 
4 (Voters — Immunity from militia duty ] 
5 [Voters to be citizens of United States ] 
6 (Mentally incompetent persons and certain ci m-
nals ineligible to vote.) 
7 [Property qualification forbidden.] 
8. (Ballot to be secret ] 
9 [Elections, when held — Terms, when begin.] 
10. [Oath of office ] 
Section 1. [Equal political rights.] 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote 
and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on 
account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this 
State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and reli-
gious rights and privileges isss 
Sec. 2. [Qualifications to vote.] 
Every citizen of the United States, eighteen years 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall set as President, as in the case of 
taw death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
ef votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT X m 
8ection 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
•action 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
aa a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
See. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. (Power to enforce amendment] 
Section 1. (Citixenship — Doe process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalised in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
sens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sac 2. [Repreeentativee — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whoie number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and dti-
sens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
S e c 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
8 e c 4. [Public debt not to be queetioned — 
Debts of the Confederacy and claims 
not to be paid J 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment cf pensions and bounties for services in sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned. But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
S e c 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citixens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of dtisens to vote — Race or 
color not to diequaiify.] 
The right of citixens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
S e c 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
A-3 
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986) [now 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1988)] provides: 
Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and 
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the property of 
car and transportation companies, when they are operated as 
a unit in more than one county/ all property of public 
utilities whether operated within one county or more, all 
mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous 
mines based on ten times the annual net proceeds thereof as 
provided in Section 59-5-57, and all other mines and mining 
claims and other valuable deposits, including lands 
containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals 
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person 
other than the owner of such minerals, all machinery used in 
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any 
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining 
property for other than mining purposes? must be assessed by 
the State Tax Commission as hereinafter provided; except 
that property assessed by the unitary method, not necessary 
to the conduct and which does not contribute to the income 
of the business shall be assessed separately. On January 1, 
1986, all methods of assessment used by the State Tax 
Commission not in statue shall be changed so as to increase 
assessment values by a factor of five. All taxable property 
not required by the Constitution or by law to be assessed by 
the State Tax Commission must be assessed by the county 
assessor of the several counties in which the same is 
situated. For the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction 
works, and smelters used exclusively for the purpose of 
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by 
the owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such 
mine or mining claim though the same is not upon such mine 
or mining claim. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986) stated: 
When the county assets]or uses the comparable sales or cost 
appraisal method in valuing taxable property for assessment 
purposes, the assessor is required to recognize that various 
fees, services, closing costs, and other expenses related to 
the transaction lessen the acutal amount that may be 
received in the transaction. The county assessor shall, 
therefore, take 80% of the value based on comparable sales 
or cost appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair 
cash value for purposes of assessment. 
A-5 
§ 11503* Tax discrimination against rail transportation prop-
erty 
(a) In this section— 
(1) "assessment" means valuation for a property tax levied by 
a taxing district. 
(2) "assessment jurisdiction" means a geographical area in a 
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad 
valorem taxation. 
(3) "rail transportation property" means property, as defined 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a 
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this 
title. 
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property, 
other than transportation property and land used primarily for 
agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commer-
cial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy. 
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or 
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any 
of them: 
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a 
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation 
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other com-
mercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris-
diction has to the true market value of the other commercial 
and industrial property. 
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be 
made under clause (1) of this subsection. 
(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail trans-
portation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate 
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same 
assessment jurisdiction. 
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carri-
er providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title. 
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